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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
CAROLINE E. CHUMNEY, 
cl/b/ a/ SUN REALTY CO., 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs .. 
CLEON B. STOTT and ZINA 





STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This action was brought by the Plaintiff to 
recover a 6% sales commission, the commission re-
commended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, 
as established in an exclusive sales agency contract 
when the o\vner sold the listed property during 
the first two months of the six months life of the 
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agreement, to a third party purchaser not pro-
cured by the Plaintiff. The sales agency contract 
expressly provided that the owner agreed to pay 
the sales commission if the listed property was 
sold by the owner or any other person, firm or 
corporation, during the period of the listing. 
STATE ME NT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff-Respondent agrees in part with 
the Statement of Facts of the Defendant-Appel-
lant and controverts in part the Statement of 
Facts, and Plaintiff states that there are addition-
al facts which should be included. Those parts 
which are controverted will be indicated as Plain-
tiff gives his statement of facts. 
The Plaintiff, Caroline E. Chumney, is a duly 
Ji~ensed real estate broker in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
doing business as Sun Realty Company. On or 
~bout the 8th day of June, 1960, Clean B. Stott 
and Zina Stott, his wife, and Raymond E. Howes, 
an agent of the plaintiff, entered into a sales 
agency contract wherein the -Defendants listed 
with the Plaintiff a parcel of business property 
identified as 4045 South State Street, Salt Lake 
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City, Utah 
The Sales Agency Contract in part provided: 
''Sun Realty; Member of Multiple Listing Bureau 
of Salt Lake Real Estate Board. 
In consideration of your agreement to list the 
property described on the reverse side of this con-
tract with the Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board, and to use reasonable ef-
forts to find a purchaser therefor, I hereby grant 
you for the period of six months from date hereof 
the exclusive right to sell, lease, or exchange said 
property or any part thereof, at the price and 
terms stated hereon, or at such other price or 
terms to which I may agree. 
During the life of this contract, if you find a 
buyer, ... or if I agree to an exchange of said pro-
perty, or any part thereof, or if said property or 
any part thereof is sold, leased or exchanged dur-
ing said term by myself or any other person, firm 
or corporation, I agree to pay you the commission 
recoJl1mended by the Salt Lake Real Estate Board 
for such sale, lease or exchange; ... " The contract 
also provides the Defendants will pay a reason-
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able attorney's fee and costs if collection by an at-
torney is necessary. 
The term of the listing was from June 8, 1960, 
to December 8, 1960, and on or about August 2, 
1960, the Defendants sold the property listed on 
the agreement to two purchasers for $77,000.00. 
The purchasers of the property were not procured, 
produced or found by the Plaintiff. The record 
does not show whether the purchasers gained 
knowledge that the property was for sale as a 
result of Plaintiff's advertisements or sign placed 
upon the property. The purchasers were not one 
of the exceptions which were listed by the Defend-
ants as being parties to whom the listed property 
could be sold without incurring the liability to pay 
the commission as agreed upon by the Plaintiff 
and Defendants. 
-
The Respondent controverts the Appellant's 
statement-as to the time- and efforts of the Plain-
tiff to se~l the property as it is recited in the first 
paragraph on page 3 of Appellant's Brief. The pro-
perty was advertised by the Plaintiff beginning 
in June and continued for some time after that 
(page 55 of the record), and the agent Raymond 
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E. Ho\ves stated at page 48 of the record that he 
knew of at least four days, two different weeks, 
when it was advertised. The advertising costs were 
not determined. lVlr. Howes at page 55 of the record 
also stated he spent four or five days, blocking it 
together, over a period of time, with the one pros-
pect referred to as National Safety Brakes. Mr. 
Howes also contacted the purchasing agents of all 
the Major oil companies (page 41), spent 3 or 4 
hours with each of four other different prospects 
(pages 39 and 40), and spent 3 or 4 days on a pro-
ject involving the listed property with a Roy Sim-
mons of Lockhart Company (page 40-41). Part of 
two days was spent vvith Defendant Clean B. Stott 
in contacting prospects in Salt Lake (page 43-44). 
A sign was procured and p1aced upon the property. 
The property was listed with the Multiple Listing 
Bureau and cards which were the same as Plain-
tiff's Exhibit No. 2 were sent out to an estimated 
167 brokers and received by possibly 800 real estate 
salesmen in the Salt Lake area (page 53). The 
property in question was discussed with the other 
agents of the Plaintiff at their weekly sales meet-
ing and other agents made inquiry concerning the 
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property. There is nothing in the record which 
would show the Plaintiff did not use reasonable 
efforts to find a purchaser and that until the sale 
of the property by the Defendants was discovered 
the Plaintiff was making diligent effort to secure 
a sale of the property. 
The Defendants were persons who have had 
experience in business. Mr. Stott had a service sta-
tion and farm implement business in Meadow, 
Utah, and the property had been listed with an-
other real estate broker prior to the listing with 
the Plaintiff. The Defendants knew a six per cent 
commission would be required upon the sale of 
the property as it was discussed with them at 
the time the Sales Agency Contract was made as 
they reserved several parties to whom they could 
sell the property without having to pay a commis-
sion. The .property was listed with the Plaintiff 
for sale at a price of $105,000.00, and Plaintiff 
had contacted the Defendants on occassion to see 
if the property could be sold for a lesser amount 
but the Defendants would not agree to a lesser 
amount. 
The Plaintiff agrees with the remainer of the 
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Defendant's Statement of Facts as stated in the 
last paragraph of page 3 of Appellant's Brief ex-
cept to state that no evidence was presented to 
the court of the rules and regulations of the Salt 
Lake Real Estate Board or of any agreement be-
tween the members of the Board. Also no defense 
or objection was raised in the trial court that the 
Sale Agency Contract was illegal or in contraven-
tion of Section 50-1-1, U.C.A. 1953, and the Utah 
Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE GROUNDS OF DEFENSE ASSERTED 
BY APPELLANT IN POINT I OF HIS BRIEF 
WERE NOT ASSERTED AND RELIED ON IN 
THE TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED OR GIVEN ANY WEIGHT ON 
REVIEW. 
POINT II 
THE SALES AGENCY CONTRACT DOES 
NOT CONTRAVENE SECTIONS 50-1-1 & 6, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AND AR-
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POINT III 
~HE SALES AGENCY CONTRACT IS ONE 
GRA.NTING AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL 
AND HAS THE NATURE OF A CONTRACT 
FOR SERVICES, AND WHEN THE SERVICES 
ARE RENDERED THE CONTRACT IS BIND-
ING UPON THE PARTIES. 
POINT IV 
"COURTS OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT IN-
TERFERE EXCEPT WHERE SHARP PRAC-
TICES OR MOST UNCONSIONABLE RE-
SULTS ARE TO BE PREVENTED." 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED THE PRO-
PER MEASURE OF RECOVERY IN AWARD-
ING PLAINTIFF THE AMOUNT OF COMMIS-




THE GROUNDS OF DEFENSE ASSERTED 
BY APPELLANT IN POINT I OF HIS BRIEF 
WERE NOT ASSERTED AND RELIED ON IN 
T-HE. TRIAL COURT AND SHOULD NOT BE 
CONSIDERED OR GIVEN ANY WEIGHT ON 
REVIEW. 
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An objection to the validity of an instrument 
or contract in suit must be made in the trial court, 
and cannot be urged for the first time in the appel-
lant court. This is the general rule as stated in 
4 C.J.S., Appeal and Error, Sec. 233, Sub-sectiop 
(c) at pages 685-687, and in 5 AmJur 2d, Appeal 
and Error, Sec. 571, at page 47. The Utah Supreme 
Court has followed this rule and it was stated in 
the case of Radley V. Smith, 6 Utah 2d 319, 313 
P. 2d 465, 468: 
"The issue of illegality was raised for the 
first time on appeal. It was not tried nor was 
any evidence presented to establish that the 
purchase contracts were purposed to or did, in 
fact, violate the rent control law. While it may 
well be, as plaintiffs suggest, that a court can 
deny relief on its own motion if the evidence 
in a case reveals the illegality of a contract, 
this would never be done unless such fact were 
clearly established." 
The defendant made no objection or defense 
to the contract in the trial court on the grounds 
that the contract upon which the action is based 
was void and unenforceable in that it allegedly 
contravenes Sections 50-1-1 and 6 of the Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, and Article XII, Section 20, Utah 
Cons~itution and no evidence was submitted or ap-
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pears in support of this contention. This defense 
and objection is raised by the Defendant for the 
first time in the Appellant's Brief and therefore 
should not be considered or given any weight or 
appeal. 
POINT II 
THE SALES AGENCY CONTRACT DOES 
NOT CONTRAVENE SECTIONS 50-1-1 an 6, 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 1953, AND AR-
TICLE XII, SECTION 20, UTAH CONSTITU-
TION. 
The plaintiff in this action is a member of 
Salt Lake Real Estate Board. The Defendants 
were not members of the Board but were parties 
who made a contract with the plaintiff to engage 
its services to procure a sale of real estate owned 
by defendant. This is not a "combination" by the 
Plaintiff and the defendants with its object to 
fix and control the price for the services of real-
tors; it is a contract for services. 
If such a "combination" existed, it would be 
among the members of the Salt Lake Real Estate 
Board, and there is absolutely no evidence in the 
record to support the contention that such a com-
10 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
bin a tion exists. 
The appellant In his brief cites the case of 
Zions Service Corp. vs. H. A. Danielson, 12 U. 2d 
369, 366 P. 2d 982, as being "virtually on all fours" 
with the case at hand. The Zions Service case is 
distinguishable from the case at hand as there the 
Plaintiff was a corporation which was incorporat-
ed by the Defendant and fourteen other masonary 
cotractors. The Court held that the organization 
of the profit corporation by the group of conrac-
tors with the attendant reciprocal contract with 
each member of the group of contractor was a 
combination which has as one of its objects the 
controlling of prices in violation of 50-1-1, U.C.A. 
1953. 
The case at hand is a completely different 
situation. The Defendants were not members of 
the alleged "combination", if such "combination" 
existed, and there is nothing in the sales agency 
contract which in any manner indicates an object 
or effort to control the prices of any professional 
services, any products of the soil, any article of 
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The very situation which is before the Court 
in this case, if the members of the Salt Lake Real 
Estate Board could be considered a "combination" 
in restraint of trade, was before the Utah Supreme 
Court in the case of Fox Film Corporation vs. ()g-
en T4eatre Company, 82 Utah 279, 17 P. 2d 294, 90 
A.L.R. 1299. In that case it was contended that a 
contract by a third party and the member of an 
alleged "combination" was unenforceable undei.· 
the Constitution and statutes of Utah. The Coutt 
stated as follows: 
The Constitution declares combinations in 
restraint of trade unlawful and against public 
policy. Canst. art. 12, Sec. 20. Sections 4475-
4485, Comp. La\vs Utah, 1917 (now Chapter 1, 
Title 50, U.C.A., 1953) provide that members 
of a combination or conspiracy to fix or regu-
late prices, etc., or quantity of production 
shall be deemed guilty of a public offense, and 
may be punished by fine or imprisonment and 
that the agreement or compact so entered into 
shall be void. This law is aimed solely to pun-
ish the individual conspirators in the manner 
and measure provided by the statutes. If the 
combination of producers and distributors had 
been made within the State of Utah, the mem-
bers of the combination would be liable to 
prosecution under the Utah statutes. However, 
there is 1zothing in tlze statutes declaring void 
the sales contracts or other contracts made by 
12 
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m.embers with tlzird parties . ... " (Emphasis 
mine) 
The case of Gammon vs. Federated Milk Pro-
ducers Assn., Inc., 11 U. 2d 421, 360 P 2d 1018, cited 
by appellant in his brief is not in point here as 
the Sa~es Agency Contract entered into by the 
Plaintiff and Defendants as has been pointed out, 
is not an agreement to fix the prices of services or 
commodities but is contract for services to be per-
formed by the Plaintiff. The action is not based 
on an "agreement in restraint of trade", because if 
any such agreement existed it would be betweer1 
mmbers of the Salt Lake Real Estate Board, an.d 
this action is based on an agreement between a 
member of that board and third parties who owned 
property they desired to sell. 
The case of Plymouth Dealer's Assn. of North-
ern California vs. U.S., 279 F. 2d 128 is also not in 
point.as the Salt Lake Real Estate Board is not on 
trial in this case and was not a party to this action; 
yet the Appellant appears to be seeking a deter-
mination that the Salt Lake Real Estate Board is 
a "combination" in restraint of trade as prohibited 
by Section 50-1-1, U.C.A., 1953. No evidence at all 
13 
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appears in the record in this matter upon which 
such a contention may be based. 
POINT III 
THE S'ALES AGENCY CONTRACT IS ONE 
GRANTING AN EXCLUSIVE RIGHT TO SELL 
AND HAS THE NATURE OF A CONTRACT 
FOR SERVICES, AND WHEN THE SERVICES 
ARE RENDERED THE CONTRACT IS BIND-
ING UPON THE PARTIES. 
The Defendants in the agreement made with 
the Plaintiff gave her for a preiod of six months 
from the date thereof not only an exclusive right 
to sell Defendants' property but provided that 
Plainiff would be entitled to the commission stated 
if the property was sold by the Defendants or any-
one during the six months period, and this agree-
ment should be binding provided there was a suf-
ficiet consideration to support the agreement. 
The agreement recites that the consideration 
rquired was for the plaintiff to list the property 
with the Multiple Listing Bureau of the Salt Lake 
Real Estate Board, and to use reasonable efforts 
to find a purchaser therefor. The record shows 
that the consideration was provided as called for. 
14 
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The property \vas listed with the Multiple Listing 
Bureau and the Plaintiff made a reasonable and 
diligent effort to find a purchaser. A sign was 
procured and placed upon the property; the pro-
perty was advertised in the newspapers; and many 
days were spent in contacting prospects and taking 
them to the property (not just four or five days 
as claimed by Appellant in their Brief). 
The situation presented in this case was con-
sidered by the Ohio Supreme Court in the case of 
Bell vs. Dimmerling et al., 149 Ohio 165, 78 N.E. 
2d 49, involving a similar agreement for the sale of 
property in which the court stated: " ... we can-
not escape the conclusion that the agreement in 
question here gave plaintiff, for a period of 90 
days from the date thereof, not only an "exclusive 
agency" but the "exclusive right" to sell the defen-
dants' property, and that plaintiff became entitled 
to the commission stated if the property was sold 
by anyone during that period, provided there was 
a sufficient consideration to support the agree-
ment". The Court went on to find that the listing· 
of the property, the advertisement, and taking of 
prospects to the property was sufficient considera-
15 
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tion to support the agreement. 
It is generally held that a broker is entitled 
to his commission under agreements of this type 
containing provision requiring payment of the 
commission upon a sale by the owner. See the an-
otation in 64 A.L.R. 395, and especially Section IV 
beginning at Page 416 where this particular type 
of agreement is considered, and also the cases cit-
ed herein in the argument following Point V. 
The Utah Supreme Court stated ~n Frederick 
May & Company vs. Dunn, 13 Utah 2d 40, 368 P. 2d 
266,268: "It is generally recognized that a broker's 
authority to se~l property is not exclusive and Lloes 
not require the payment of the commission to the 
broker upon a sale not procured by him, unless 
made so by the contract of employment in clear 
and unequivocal terms or by necessary implica-
tion". Also in Lewis vs. Dahl, 108 Utah 486, 161 P. 
-2d 362, 160 ALR 1040, the Utah Supreme Court 
recognized the right of the broker to receive a com-
mission if there had been an actual sale during the 
life of an agreement similar to the agreement in 
this case. Here the terms are clear and unequivocal 
in the requirement of the commission and an 
16 
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actual binding sale occured during the period of 
the li~ting. 
POINT IV 
"COURTS OF EQUITY SHOULD NOT IN-
TERFERE EXCEPT WHERE SHARP PRAC-
TICE OR MOST UNCONSCIONABL,E RE-
SULTS ARE TO BE PREVENTED". 
The above quotation is from Peck vs. Judd, 7 
Utah 2d 420, 326 P. 2d 712, 717. In Cole v. Parker, 
5 Utah 2d 263, 300 P. 2d 623, 626, the Utah Supreme 
Court states: "In the absence of fraud or imposi-
tion, the parties are bound by the price or measure 
of value they have agreed on, and such price n1ust 
qe paid notwithstanding it may be excessive. The 
Court cannot supervise decisions made in the busi-
ness world and grant relief where the bargain 
proves improvident". 
The record in this case shows the parties dealt 
at arms length and entered into the agreem.nt with 
full knowldge of the requirements of th~ agree-
ment. There was no fraud or sharp practices prac-
ticed or even claimed to have been practiced to in-
duce the Defendants to sign the agreement. The 
commission was discussed with the defendants 
17 
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and the defendants reserved five names of parties 
to whom they could sell the property themse~ves 
without being liable for the commission. 
The issue in this case was not before the court 
in the case of Andreason vs. Hansen 8 Utah 26 370, 
335 P 2d 704, nor can this writer discover anywhere 
in said case where the Court stated "that contracts 
which call for the payment of a predetermined 
sum in the case of default are usually construed 
as agreements to pay penalties and not liquidated 
damages" as alleged by Appellant in his brief at 
pag·e 10. The Court did state as follows: 
"It is true that provisions for "stipulated" or 
"liquidated" damages in cases of breach of contract 
have sometimes prescribed forfeiture of a1nounts 
so grossly disproportionate to any actual damage 
that to enforce the provision would shoc1: the con-
science. In such instances, the Courts, invoking 
their powers of equity, refuse to enforce such 
penalties. In that connection however, it is to be 
kept firmly in mind, that the courts recognize the 
rights of parties freely to contract and are ex-
tremely reluctant to do anything which \vill fail to 
give full recognition to such rights." 
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In Ephraim Theatre Company v. Hawk, 7 
Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221, 223, the Court in up-
holding the terms of the agreement states: "Gen-
erally speaking, neither of the parties, nor the 
court has any right to ignore or modify conditions 
which are clearly expressed merely because it may 
subject one of the parties to hardship, but they 
must be enforced in accordance with the intention 
as * * * manifested by the language used by the 
parties to the contract." 
The defendants Mr. and Mrs. Stott entered 
into this agreement freely with knowledge of its 
terms. The terms of the contract are clearly ex-
prssed and they were discussed because tlte defelld-
ants asked for the exceptions to be made, and also 
the Defendants at a prior time had the described 
property listed with another broker for sale under 
the same type of contract. The defendants were 
not strangers to the business world, as they operat-
ed and owned a service station and farm imple-
ment business at Meadow, Utah. 
There is not present in this case the sitt1ations 
which have existed in the cases where the court has 
found a penalty to exist. There is no forfeiture of 
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twenty per cent or more of the purchase price of a 
parcel of real estate. There is a contract for ser-
vices which the defendant requested the plaintiff 
to perform at an agreed price, and the services 
were performed. 
In Carlson v. Hamilton, 8 Utah 2d 272, 332 
P. 2d 989, a defaulting purchaser of real property 
under a uniform real estate contract bro~ght ac-
tion to recover moneys paid under the contract. 
After deducting the reasonable rental value, de-
preciation of property and other special damages 
sustaind by the seller, the trial court found that 
$2,119.94 of the $6,680.00 paid under the contract 
would be considered as liquidated dan1age~ and 
awarded the defaulting purchaser judgment for 
that amount on the theory that it \vas determined 
in PerJ.\ins v. Spencer, 121 Utah 468, 242 P. 2d 446, 
that a defaulting buyer could require the return 
of all sums paid in over and above the actual dam-
ages caused the seller. In reversing the judgment 
of the trial court and allowing the seller to retain 
the $2,119.94 as liquidated damages, the court stat-
ed that Perkins v. Spencer is no authority for such 
doctrine. It was reiterated that equity abhors un-
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conscionability shocking to such a degree that the 
function of equity would be misconceived and mis-
applied by the enforcement of such unconscionab-
ility, even though it may have been the subject of 
contract. 
The court stated the two cases were "poles 
apart" - the Perkins case calling for an exaction 
of 27% of the purchase price while in the Carlson 
case the amount of $2,119.64 was only nine and one-
half (9V2%) per cent of the purchase price of $22,-
000.00, which the court found to be a reasonably 
small percentage of the price for a breach that 
may cause items of damage susceptible of little 
but conjectural measurement. Further the Court 
stated: "People should be entitld to co11tract on 
their own terms without the indulgence of pater-
nalism by courts in the alleviation of one side or 
another from the effects of a bad bargain." 
In the case now before the court the terms pro-
vided that in return for the services to be perform-
ed by the Plai11tiff the Defendants would pay a 
commission of six per cent of the price paid for the 
described property upon a sale of the property, and 
said commission is neither a penalty nor a for-
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feiture, The Defenants could have waited and sold 
the property in five months and no comn1ission 
could have been claimed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT APPLIED TI-IE PRO~ 
PER MEASURE OF RECOVERY IN A WARD-
~NG PLAINTIFF THE AMOUNT OF., COlVIlVIIS-
SION SPECIFIED IN THE SALES AGENCY 
CONTRACT. 
In the case of Lewis v. Dahl, 180 Utah 486, 161 
P. 2d 362, 160 ALR 1040, a similar agreement was 
before the court, with a broker bringing action 
for his commission on sale of property by the own-
er. In this case there were two concurring opinions 
and a dissenting opinion, but one point was in ap-
parent agreement by all the Justices, and this 
was that had there been an actual "sale" of the 
property by the owner, the broker vvould have 
been entitled to his commission. The case ttn·ned 
on whether there had been a "sale" of the property 
during the term of the listing. In the case nc,, ... be-
fore the court the Defendants admit there \vas a 
binding sale of the property on August 2, 1960, 
within the period prescribed by the agreement of 
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the parties. 
The situation In this case fits the require-
ments set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Frederick May & Company v. Dunn 13 Utah 2d 
40, 368 P. 2d 266, 268, as here the contract by "clear 
and unequivocal terms require the payment of the 
commission to the broker upon a sale not procured 
by him. 
The case of Isern vs. Gordon 127 l(an 296, 273 
Pac 435, 64 ALR 391, cited by the Appellant in his 
brief at page 12 concerns an agreement where the 
broker was given the sole and exclusive right to 
sell a parcel of property, a type of contract under 
which it has generally been held that a broker 
cannot recover commissions for sales made by the 
owner to someone. not procured by the broker. The 
court in its opinion distinguishes the case then be-
fore the bar from the cases involving agreements 
of the type embodying special provisions as to 
commission, at was present in Kirshner v. Bro,vn, 
78 Kan. 53, 96 Pac. 848, and is present in this case. 
The measure of damages under a breach of an 
agreement granting an exclusive right to sell has 
beeri limited to the actual damage that the broker 
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has suffered in some cases but in others the mea-
sure of damage_s has been the stipul2ted commis-
sion. 64 ALR pp. 410-415. But this is not the mea-
sure of recovery which has been applied in cases 
involving contracts of the type now before the 
Court. 
The courts have upheld the right of a broker 
to recover his commission where a sale is effected 
~ithout his agency under an exclusiYe contract 
\Vhich contained special provisions as to the pay-
ment of commissions where sale is effected by 
owner or anyone. See 64 ALR, Section IV, at page 
416, and the following recent cases where the brok-
ers right to commission has been affirmed: Pearce 
v. Previews, 201 F 2d 385; Flynn v. McGinty, 61 
So 2d 318; Hubert vs. Block-Meeks, 297 S.W. 2d 
724; Genske v. Christensen, 189 Wis. 620, 208 N.W. 
467; also see 2 Restatement of Agency 1058, Sec-
tion 449, comment b. and 12 C.J.S., Brokers, Sec. 
94, at pages 219-~20. 
The damages sustained by the plaintiff ran-
not be measured by the amount of time spent by 
the agents and the money spent on signs and ad-
vertisement. There are other elements which could 
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be pro-rated to each listing given to a broket· such 
as the overhead expenses of the office-fees due 
to the Multiple ~isting Board. There are other 
conjectural damages as were considered in the 
Carlson v. Hamilton case, as here who can sa.y that 
Plaintiff would not have produced a buyer in the 
first month of the listing agrement if Plaintiff 
had been allowed to sell property for $77,000.00, 
the price at which Defendants sold it, or even for 
$85,000.00 instead of the $105,000.00 price Defend-
ants were demanding. The Plaintiff had prospects 
interested in the property and they may have pur-
chased if they could have obtained it for a figure 
less than $90,000.00 And it is possible that a pur-
chaser may have been produced by the Plaintiff 
during the full term of the agreement, especially 
if the price had been reduced as Plaintiff's agents 
had discussed with Defendants. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Trial 
Court interpreted and applied the law correctly 
to the facts in this case and awarded the Plaintiff 
the amount of the commission agreed upon by the 
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parties in their Sales Agency Agreement. The 
judgment should be affirmed and the plaintiff 
awarded her costs and attorney fees incurred in 
these proceedings. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Is! J. Gordon Knudsen 
LEON M. FRAZIER and 
J. GORDON KNUDSEN 
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